5IE471 – Introduction to Economic Analysis of Contract and Corporate Law
Související stránky
The course examines several prominent theories of economic analysis of contract and corporate law. The course is introductory and provides a broad overview of the field and its application to a number of commercial and corporate law related issues. Topics will include behavioral game theory, the Coase theorem, theory of the firm or role of securities regulation and bankruptcy law reform.
The course requires active participation in and preparation for weekly discussions. Students are expected to be open to new ideas and to learn to articulate the perspectives of others who do not share their own specialty training.
The structure of the course is as follows:
1. Introduction to the economic analysis of law
2. Game theory and collective action problem
- Cooter a Ulen, (2003), Law & Economics, Pearson, Addison and Wesley, str. 195 – 200.
- Gillinson (2004), Why Cooperate? A Multi-Disciplinary Study of Collective Action, Overseas Development Institute.
- Hardin, Russell, (2003) „The Free Rider Problem“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3. Transaction costs
- Coase, (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics
- Polinsky, (2003), An Introduction to Law and Economics, Aspen Publishers, str. 13 – 14
- Cooter a Ulen, (2003), Law & Economics, Pearson, Addison and Wesley, str. 211 – 225.
4. Introduction to contract law – basic theory, formation of contracts
5. Corporate contracts
6. Theory of the firm
- Coase, Ronald H., 1952, “The Nature of the Firm, “Economica N.S., 4 (1937): 386-405, reprint in G. J. Stingler and K. E. Boulding, eds., Readings in Price Theory. Homewood, III.: Richard D. Irwin.
- Alchian, Armen, A. and Demsetz, Harold, 1972, „Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, “ American Economic Review, 62: 777-95.
- Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G., and Alchian, Armen, 1978, „Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, „Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297-326.
7. Agency costs and related party transactions
- Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 305-360.
- Jensen (1986): Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finances, and Takeovers, AER, Vol. 76
8. Corporate control transactions
- Easterbrook, F. a Fischel, D. (1991), The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press. str. 109 – 145.
- Jensen (1989), Active Investors, LBOS, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, str. 35-44.
- Bebchuk, L., Kahan, M., The ‘Lemons Effect’ in Corporate Freeze-Outs (1999). NBERWorking PaperNo. W6938.
9. Securities regulation
10. Bankruptcy law and reorganizations
- White, Corporate Bankruptcy, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 1 (A-D), Peter Newman (editor), Stockton Press, New York, 1998, str. 436-445.
- Baird, Douglas G. and Rasmussen, Robert K., The End of Bankruptcy. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, 2002.
